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Resolving Differences in Willingness to Pay 
and Willingness to Accept: Reply 
By JASON F. SHOGREN AND DERMOT J. HAYES * 
Gwendolyn C. Morrison (1997) raises a 
logical point regarding our experimental test 
of the divergence between willingness to pay 
(WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) 
measures of economic value (Shogren et al., 
1994). She argues that our design does not 
provide a true test of the existence of a 
fundamental endowment effect since we did 
not control for the potential of a pivoting 
indifference map (Daniel Kahneman et al., 
1990). She concludes that even though our ev- 
idence shows that the mean WTP and WTA 
bids for market goods with close substitutes 
(e.g., candy bars and coffee mugs) converge 
after market experience, the endowment effect 
might still be alive and well, albeit at statisti- 
cally insignificant levels. 
We have two problems with this argument. 
Our first doubt rests on the seemingly arbitrary 
way Morrison drew the figures to support the 
contention that the WTA/WTP difference is 
larger for a good with imperfect substitutes 
than for a good with perfect substitutes. 
Morrison's Figures 2 and 3 show that the 
WTA/WTP difference for the good with im- 
perfect substitutes (WTAi - WTPj) is greater 
than the WTA/WTP difference if no pivoting 
occurs ($1 - $0). But the figures also show 
that the WTA/WTP difference for the good 
with close substitutes (WTAC - WTPC) is 
greater than ($1 - $0). If this were her only 
argument, then our finding that (WTAC - 
WTPC) equaled ($1 - $0) would refute the 
endowment hypothesis. This is true,because 
pivoting-if it occurs-causes both WTAi- 
WTPi and WTAC - WTPC to exceed ($1 -$o), 
and so our finding that WTAC - WTPC equals 
($1 - $0) is sufficient to refute the pivoting 
hypothesis. To get around this problem she ar- 
gues that the WTA/WTP difference for goods 
with imperfect substitutes must be greater 
than for goods with close substitutes, holding 
the "degrees pivoted" constant at some un- 
specified point. Using this logic, she argues 
that "we failed to pick up the lesser of the two 
effects because the difference was not statis- 
tically significant." 
Figure 1 below redraws Morrison's Figures 
2 and 3 to show that the WTA/WTP differ- 
ences for goods with close substitutes are ex- 
actly equal to the difference for goods with 
imperfect substitutes, that is WTAI - WTPi = 
WTAC - WTPC. All we have to do to get this 
result is to pivot both indifference curves by 
the same amount at point qo in Figure 1 (a) and 
at q1 in Figure 1 (b). This version of the piv- 
oting indifference curves does not show a 
WTA/WTP difference based on the degree of 
substitution and, therefore, refutes Morrison's 
argument that WTAi - WTPI should be more 
detectable than WTAC - WTPC. Without a 
more formal or convincing demonstration that 
WTA/WTP difference is larger for goods with 
imperfect substitutes, Morrison's argument is 
that the endowment effect is lurking behind 
the substitution effect and refuses to show its 
head separately from the substitution effect. If 
this is truly the case, why not call what is left 
of the endowment effect argument a substitu- 
tion effect and be done with it? 
Second, it seems impulsive to argue that a 
set of experiments did not pick up an effect 
that is said to exist without at least proposing 
a more sensitive way to detect this elusive ef- 
fect. As an example, regulatory agencies have 
long ago given up on attempting to prove that 
a particular food is safe. Instead, they act when 
a food is shown not to be safe and otherwise 
* Shogren: Department of Economics and Finance, 
University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY 82071 and Council 
of Economic Advisers, Executive Office of the President, 
Washington, DC 20502; Hayes: Department of Econom- 
ics, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011. All views 
remain our own. 
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FIGURE 1. PIVOTING INDIFFERENCE CURVES GIVEN 
PERFECT AND IMPERFECT SUBSTITUTES 
let the preponderance of evidence suggest that 
a food is safe. Our experiments did not reject 
a WTA/WTP divergence for the goods with 
close substitutes, but we can never prove that 
such a divergence does not exist. It always has 
been, and remains, an experimental impossi- 
bility to reject an alternative hypothesis. 
But even if we reject Morrison's argument, 
there is still the empirical evidence that an en- 
dowment effect seems to exist in, some lab 
experiments but not in ours. Kahneman et 
al. ( 1990), for example, observed a persis- 
tent WTP/WTA divergence with a Becker- 
DeGroot-Marschak ( BDM ) auction for goods 
with readily available substitutes ( Gordon 
Becker et al., 1964). Perhaps the endowment 
effect lurks undetected due to the temperament 
of the auction institution used in Shogren et al. 
( 1994) the sealed-bid, second price Vickrey 
auction repeated over several market trials 
(William Vickrey, 1961). A conceivable short- 
coming of the Vickrey auction is that the re- 
peated signals sent by the endogenous market 
price contaminate individual bids into unreli- 
able and unreasonable beacons of true prefer- 
ence (for example, see Kahneman et al., 
1996). Unfortunately, there are too many dif- 
ferences in design parameters in the Shogren 
et al. ( 1994) and Kahneman et al. ( 1990) stud- 
ies to determine clearly why WTP and WTA 
should converge in one incentive compatible 
auction and not the other. 
To remedy this, Shogren et al. ( 1996) re- 
tested both auction institutions holding all 
other design elements constant (e.g., identical 
goods, ten trials, voluntary subjects, a fixed 
monetary endowment, and the same moni- 
tors). The new evidence suggests that while 
a WTA/WTP disparity exists in the first trial 
for both auctions, the gap closed quickly in 
the Vickrey auction, but remained in the 
BDM auction. Mean and median WTA/WTP 
ratios decreased from 1.4 in trial 1 to 0.88 in 
trial 9 for the candy bar, and decreased from 
2.5 in trial 1 to 1.04 in trial 10 for the coffee 
mug. The ratio of WTA/WTP in the BDM 
auction, however, ranged from 1.5 to 1.9 for 
a candy bar and 1.4 to 2 for a coffee mug over 
all trials. 
If an endowment effect exists at a level suf- 
ficiently weighty to affect economic effi- 
ciency, we should have observed a persistent 
disparity under both auction institutions-we 
did not. The significant WTA/WTP disparity 
existing in the first trial in both auctions dis- 
appeared quickly in the Vickrey auction but 
persisted in the BDM auction. This suggests 
that the disparity might not be due to a fun- 
damental endowment effect but rather to the 
contrasting market dynamics of the two auc- 
tions. The BDM auction provides little active 
involvement and market learning. Market 
price is randomly determined, exogenous, aso- 
cial, and as such, the bidders have no oppor- 
tunity to interact in a market setting that 
rewards good trades and punishes bad ones. 
The lack of competition with other buyers or 
sellers prevents the market from imposing any 
discipline on their bidding behavior (also see 
Peter Bohm et al., 1995). 
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In contrast, the Vickrey auction creates a 
market with meaningful feedback from an 
endogenous market price that provides the 
opportunity to learn from market experience 
that does not reward strategically high WTA 
offers and low WTP bids. This suggests that 
the WTP-WTA disparity depends on the 
auction institution, not on a deviation from 
neoclassical rationality as suggested by the 
endowment effect. The persistent value dis- 
parity appears to be an artifact of the relative 
levels of useful market feedback in the two 
auctions. 
One might counter that the Vickrey auc- 
tion with repeated market trials generates 
too much competition, propelling the WTP/ 
WTA convergence because the auction over- 
heats -too much competition drives WTP up 
beyond the true market value and WTA down 
below the true market value as bidders try to 
outdo one another to win for winning's sake. 
The winner receives extra benefit from being 
the "top dog" among his or her peer group. 
If the top dog hypothesis is legitimate, a sub- 
ject's bid, bi, in the Vickrey auction equals 
his or her private value, vi, for the good plus 
the extra benefit, ui, from winning the auc- 
tion, bi = vi + ui. Shogren et al. ( 1996) tested 
and rejected this top dog hypothesis in an in- 
duced valuation treatment. The evidence was 
that nearly 90 percent of all bids in all trials 
were less than or equal to a bidder's private 
value, vi. The mean ratio of a subject' s actual 
bid to his or her private induced value, the 
BPV ratio, was slightly less than unity for the 
majority of 15 trials; the median BPV ratio 
generally equaled, and never exceeded, unity. 
Bids generally were less than or equal to the 
predicted bid. The fear that the Vickrey auc- 
tion overheats and generates unreliable and 
unreasonable bids is not universally sup- 
ported (for an alternative view, se,e John 
Kagel et al., 1987). 
Is the endowment effect a fundamental part 
of choice or simply an artifact of a weak 
exchange environment? The weaker the ex- 
change institution, the weaker the socialization 
of rational behavior and the stronger the po- 
tential hold of asocial anomalies on choice. If 
the objective is to elicit values for commodi- 
ties in market-like settings that punish mis- 
takes and reward good decisions, an exchange 
institution such as the Vickrey auction with 
repeated trials is appropriate. These auctions 
mimic an institutional structure that reinforces 
rational choices under the gravity of market 
dynamics. Consequently, disparities in WTP 
and WTA measures of value disappear for 
commodities with many substitutes given re- 
peated experience. Robust market exchange 
straightens the arch of indifference curves 
through intermediate monetary exchange; per- 
haps this robust exchange also humbles the 
hold of pivoting indifference curves. If the en- 
dowment effect is a substantive phenomenon, 
the effect should prevent a convergence of val- 
ues across economic institutions. The claim 
that highly active exchange institutions are too 
crude to sniff out a statistically significant en- 
dowment effect suggests the effect might not 
be of economic significance in these contexts. 
All this may change, however, as we consider 
goods in thin or nonexistent markets where the 
opportunities for arbitrage are few and far be- 
tween. Opportunities for endowment-like ef- 
fects to persist and go unpunished by market 
discipline imply that such behavior may play 
a role in the valuation and exchange of non- 
market goods. 
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